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In the first part of the paper (sec. 1–4), I argue that Elqayam and Evan’s (2011) distinction
between normative and instrumental conceptions of cognitive rationality corresponds to
deontological vs. teleological accounts in meta-ethics. I suggest that Elqayam and Evans’
distinction be replaced by the distinction between a-priori intuition-based vs. a-posteriori
success-based accounts of cognitive rationality. The value of cognitive success lies in its
instrumental rationality for almost-all practical purposes. In the second part (sec. 5–7), I
point out that the Elqayam and Evans’s distinction between normative and instrumental
rationality is coupled with a second distinction: between logically general vs. locally
adaptive accounts of rationality. I argue that these are two independent distinctions that
should be treated as independent dimensions. I also demonstrate that logically general
systems of reasoning can be instrumentally justified. However, such systems can only be
cognitively successful if they are paired with successful inductive reasoning, which is the
area where the program of adaptive (ecological) rationality emerged, because there are
no generally optimal inductive reasoning methods. I argue that the practical necessity of
reasoning under changing environments constitutes a dilemma for ecological rationality,
which I attempt to solve within a dual account of rationality.
Keywords: is and ought, normative accounts of rationality, means-end inference, cognitive success, general vs.
locally adaptive rationality
INTRODUCTION: RECENT CRITICISMS OF NORMATIVE
SYSTEMS OF REASONING IN PSYCHOLOGY
According to a common conception (Elqayam and Evans, 2011,
p. 234), classical logic was the dominant normative standard of
rational thinking in cognitive psychology until the 1960s. When
psychologists discovered empirically that, in many domains,
human reasoning did not accord with the principles of logic
(e.g., Wason, 1966), these findings were interpreted as signs of
human irrationality (cf. Evans, 2002). Beginning in the 1970s this
interpretation came increasingly under attack by authors who
demonstrated that deviations from classical logic can neverthe-
less be rational (e.g., Cohen, 1981; Gigerenzer, 1991; Oaksford
and Chater, 1994). For example, when conditionals are uncertain,
the optimal rules of conditional reasoning are no longer classical
(see section Instrumental Justification of Deductive Reasoning).
Some authors suggested that psychologists should adopt a differ-
ent normative system, as an alternative to classical logic, such as,
for example, Bayesian probability theory or decision theory (e.g.,
Oaksford and Chater, 1991, 2007). However, human reasoning
has been observed to deviate from the norms of probability and
decision theory, too (Kahneman and Tversky, 1972; Barbey and
Sloman, 2007). Therefore other authors suggested that certain
forms of “adaptive” or “instrumental” rationality do not presup-
pose any normative system at all; rather they can and should be
studied in a purely descriptive way (e.g., Evans and Over, 1996;
Gigerenzer et al., 1999). A clear exposition of this position is given
in Elqayam and Evans (2011). I take this position as a starting
point for my critical discussion of the notions of rationality that
underlie the psychological debate on norms of reasoning.
According to Elqayam and Evans (2011, p. 234), prescriptive
normativism is the view that human thinking should be evaluated
against (the rules of) a normative system, S, and ought to conform
to it, where S is a general system of reasoning such as logic, proba-
bility theory, or decision theory1. Elqayam and Evans launch three
major criticisms against prescriptive normativism: (1) First, there
are different mutually competing normative systems of reasoning,
such as classical vs. non-classical logics, frequentistic vs. Bayesian
probability theory, probability theory vs. fuzzy logic, etc. This
leads to the problem of “arbitration,” i.e., of deciding between
different normative systems. For Elqayam and Evans it is more-or-
less impossible to give an objective or unbiased approach to this
problem, because normative systems understand their “norms”
of reasoning as fundamental norms, being based on more-or-
less a-priori intuitions which are not capable of further rational
justification2. (2) Second, the endeavors of many psychologists to
select one of these normative systems on empirical grounds are
typically based on is-ought fallacies. According to a famous philo-
sophical doctrine that goes back to Hume (1739/40, part 1, §1), it
is logically impossible to infer an Ought from an Is. (3) Elqayam
and Evans recognize instances of ought-is fallacies in psychological
1A forerunner is Evans and Over’s notion of “rationality2” (1996, p. 8).
2Elqayam and Evans (2011), p. 237f; in particular p. 277 in reply to Schurz
(2011a).
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research, in which psychologists infer incorrectly from their pref-
erence for a certain normative system S that a certain theoretical
interpretation of people’s empirical cognitive behavior is “cor-
rect,” due to its coherence with the rules of reasoning prescribed
by system S—a position which Elqayam and Evans call “empir-
ical normativism” (Elqayam and Evans, 2011, p. 244, 234). In
this way normative prescriptivism introduces biases which hinder
empirical research.
Because of these problems Elqayam and Evans argue that
psychologists of reasoning would be better off if they gave up
normative prescriptivism and dispensed with appeals to any
normative system whatsoever. They call this opposite position
descriptivism and mention Gigerenzer and Todd’s conception of
adaptive (ecological) rationality as well as Evans andOver’s instru-
mental rationality as prototypes of this position (Elqayam and
Evans, 2011, P. 246f)3. For Evans and Over, a method of reasoning
or decision-making is instrumentally rational if it is reliable and
efficient for achieving one’s subjective goals (1996, p. 8). Adaptive
rationality is considered a kind of instrumental rationality which
emphasizes the dependence of the optimal means of achieving
one’s goals on the given environment; so cognition can only be
instrumentally rational if it is ecologically adapted. Like Evans
and Over (1996), Todd and Gigerenzer (2012, p. 15) criticize
the purported “a-priori” nature of normative systems and argue
that the fitness of cognitive methods should be empirically tested
in natural environments. Elqayam and Evans (2011, p. 247f)
assure readers that their descriptivist position does not exclude
normative recommendations entirely from the field of cognitive
psychology. However, they argue that all that can be generally
said about “rational thinking” (thereby quoting Baron, 2008) is
that rational thinking is “whatever kind of thinking helps people
to achieve their goals.” This sounds very close to the pragmatist
philosophy of William James.
In the following sections, I will try to embed the non-
normativist positions of Evans and Over (1996), Elqayam and
Evans (2011), and Todd and Gigerenzer (2012) into a more
general philosophical framework. I will suggest replacing the
conception of “normativist” vs. “instrumentalist” rationality by
two independent distinctions: the distinction between intuition-
based vs. success-based conceptions of rationality, and the dis-
tinction between logico-general vs. local-adaptive conceptions of
rationality.
DEONTOLOGICAL vs. CONSEQUENTIALIST JUSTIFICATIONS
OF NORMS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE IS-OUGHT PROBLEM
The distinction between normative vs. instrumental rationality
is related to a standard distinction in meta-ethics: that between
deontological vs. consequentialist justifications of norms. In
deontological systems of ethics, the normative basis of justi-
fication consists of certain fundamental norms, which assert
that certain general forms of action are categorically (i.e.,
unconditionally) obligatory or ethically good in themselves. In
contrast, in consequentialist systems of ethics, actions are justified
as normatively right because of the value of their consequences,
3Cf. Gigerenzer et al. (1999), Todd andGigerenzer (2012), and Evans andOver
(1996).
or at least of those consequences that were foreseeable by the
actor (Broad, 1930; Anscombe, 1958; Birnbacher, 2003; ch. 4).
Consequentialist ethics are further divided into two groups: in
value-consequentialist (or non-teleological) ethics, actions are
normatively right because their consequences are ethically valu-
able, while in teleological ethics, actions are normatively right
because their consequences promote the satisfaction of extra-
ethical values, which consist in the factual goals of people,
ultimately the avoidance of pain and achievement of pleasure
(cf. Frankena, 1963, ch. 2). The most famous historical exam-
ple of a deontological position is Kant’s categorial imperative,
which requires one to treat all morally relevant subjects equally
and seems to be ethically right quite independently from its
consequences. The most famous historical example of a teleolog-
ical position is Benthem’s and Mill’s utilitarianism, for which an
action is ethically right just in case it results in the “greatest hap-
piness of the greatest number.”While utilitarianism is an altruistic
principle, its egoistic variant is egoistic hedonism, according to
which an action is right for an agent if it maximizes the agent’s
own personal pleasure.
Let us discuss these ethical positions in the light of Hume’s the-
sis that norms and ethical values cannot be logically derived from
descriptive facts. Contemporary attempts to prove Hume’s the-
sis by means of modern logic have faced surprising difficulties.
These difficulties derive from the paradox of Prior (1960), which
is based on two facts:
(i) From purely descriptive premises, for example ¬p (e.g., “I am
not poor”) one may derivemixed statements such as ¬p∨Pq,
with “P” for “is permitted” (e.g., “I am not poor or stealing
is permitted”).
(ii) From the mixed statement ¬p∨Pq together with the
descriptive premise p one can derive the purely normative
statement “Pq.”
Prior argued that if mixed statements count as descriptive, then
(ii) counts as an is-ought inference, and if mixed statements
count as normative, then (i) counts as an is-ought inference. So
it seems that is-ought inferences result in either case (which con-
stitutes Prior’s paradox). The major insight that emerged from
this paradox was that an adequate explication of Hume’s is-ought
thesis must be based on the threefold division of statements into
purely descriptive, mixed, and purely normative. Based on this
insight, Schurz (1997) proved that the following two versions of
Hume’s thesis hold in all standard logical systems of multi-modal
first-order logic:
- (H1) No non-logically true purely normative conclusion can be
derived from a consistent set of purely descriptive premises.
- (H2) Every mixed conclusion which follows logically from a
set of purely descriptive premises is normatively irrelevant in
the sense that all of its normative subformulas are replace-
able by other arbitrary subformulas, salva validitate of the
inference.
Thesis (H1) entails the inverse Hume thesis (H3) which
says that no non-tautologous descriptive statement can be
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logically inferred from a consistent set of purely normative
premises4.
In the light of the logical is-ought gap described by Hume,
the explained positions of deontological, value-consequentialist,
and teleological ethics describe the three major ways in which
normative systems can be justified. Norms cannot be derived
from facts alone, but they can be justified by deriving them
from either (i) other norms having the status of fundamental
norms (as in deontological ethics), (ii) fundamental ethical val-
ues, as in value-consequentialist accounts, or (iii) fundamental
extra-moral values which are given by human goals or inter-
ests, as in teleological accounts. All three models of justification
are based on a so-called means-end inference, which has the
following form:
(1) Means-end inference:
Normative premise: A is a (fundamental) norm or value.
Descriptive premise: B is a necessary (or optimal) means for
achieving A.
Normative conclusion: B is a derived norm or value.
This form of means-end inference is accepted as analytically valid
within more-or-less all kinds of ethical theories, whether they are
deontological, value-consequential, or teleological. Here “analyt-
ically valid” means “conceptually valid,” i.e., “valid because of
the meaning of the involved terms,” but not “logically valid,”
i.e., “valid solely because of the meaning of the involved log-
ical terms” (cf. Schurz, 2013, ch. 3.3–3.4). For example, “This
is round, therefore it has no edges” is an analytically but not
logically valid argument. Moreover, the analytical validity of the
means-end inference holds only for necessary and optimal means
to an end, but fails for sufficient means5.
The second premise of the means-end inference, concern-
ing the means-end relation, is a factual statement, expressing
the results of empirical research. Thus, the means-end principle
explains how the findings of empirical scientists can become prac-
tically relevant without committing an is-ought fallacy: empirical
findings allow one to derive a multitude of derived norms from
a small set of fundamental norms or values. The latter ones can-
not be established by empirical science (following from Hume’s
is-ought thesis), but are given to the scientist by extra-scientific
institutions, e.g., by politicians or by the society as a whole
(Schurz, 2010, §6).
With help of means-end inferences one can only prove hypo-
thetical (conditional) norms or values, i.e., implications of the
4Cf. Schurz (1997): for (H1) theorems 3–5 (p. 118, 121, 124), for (H2)
theorems 1–2 (p. 92, 102), for (H3) prop. 7 (p. 74). For related work cf.
Stuhlmann-Laeisz (1983), Pigden (1989), Galvan (1988); general introduc-
tions are Hudson (1969) and Pigden (2010).
5For example, for the purpose of letting fresh air into the room, tearing down
a wall is a sufficient but neither a necessary nor an optimal means. Some peo-
ple object that the means-end inference fails even for necessary (or optimal)
means, since if the necessary means B for realizing the fundamental norm A is
itself intrinsically bad, B should not be realized. However, in such a case it is
unreasonable to accept A as a fundamental norm. Thus, although this objec-
tion points to an important constraint on fundamental norms, it fails as an
argument against the means-end inference.
form “if X is accepted as a norm or value, then Y is also norma-
tively required or valuable”; but one can never justify categorial
(unconditional) norms in this way (cf. Schurz, 1997, theorem 6,
p. 132). For the latter purpose one needs additional premises.
They come either in the form of fundamental norms or val-
ues, or, as in deontological or value-consequentialist accounts, in
the form of factual interests of people together with fundamen-
tal ethical is-ought or is-value bridge principles, as in teleological
theories. The fundamental bridge principle of hedonistic or util-
itarian ethics, for example, states that “if the realization of a state
of affairs p serves the interests of (some, most, or all) human
beings, then p is valuable and ought to be realized.” In deonto-
logical and value-consequentialist ethics, the most fundamental
norms and values are assumed to be justified by a-priori intu-
ition. However, teleological theories also contain such an element
of a-priori intuition, in the form of a presupposed is-ought (or
is-value) bridge principle. Bridge principles of this sort cannot be
justified by logical inference (Hume’s insight), nor by arguing that
they are “valid by definition” (Moore’s insight)6; they are often
controversial and are accepted only in some but not in all ethical
theories.
A-PRIORI INTUITION-BASED vs. A-POSTERIORI
SUCCESS-BASED ACCOUNTS OF RATIONALITY
I will now try to connect the psychological distinction between
normative and instrumental rationality to the philosophical
framework of deontological, value-consequential, and teleologi-
cal accounts in ethics, and evaluate the former distinction in the
light of the latter. Obviously the position of Elqayam and Evans
(2011) is a kind of teleological one, but exactly which one is not
entirely clear, at least not for me. Nor is it prima facie clear which
position is exactly criticized in their arguments against normative
rationality—all non-teleological positions, or only certain ones?
Let’s see.
Elqayam and Evans understand the rules of a normative system
of reasoning S as “evaluative” norms. They assume that evalua-
tive norms are based on a-priori intuition, being unamenable to
further justification. From a philosophical viewpoint, this view
of (evaluative) norms is too narrow, since normative systems
(be they deontological or value-consequentialist) do contain a
multitude of derived norms, which are justified as (optimal or
necessary) means to satisfying certain fundamental norms. For
example, for Elqayam and Evans “poverty should not exist” is
an evaluative norm (Elqayam and Evans, 2011, p. 236), but this
norm is instrumental for the more fundamental norm that peo-
ple should not suffer. Just the same is true for normative systems
of reasoning: the fact that a general system of reasoning S such
as logic or probability theory is accepted as a normative standard
does not imply that reasoning in accord with S can only be justi-
fied by “a-priori intuition.” Different ways of justifying the rules of
logic or probability theory in terms of more fundamental norms,
such as cognitive success or truth-conduciveness will be discussed
in the section on General vs. Locally Adapted Rationality.
6Cf. Moore’s famous “open question” argument against the “naturalistic
fallacy” of defining “Ought” by “Is” (1903, p. 15f).
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There is, however, a philosophical position to which Elqayam
and Evan’s criticism does indeed apply. A well-known exam-
ple of this position is Cohen’s account of rationality (1981). For
Cohen, rules of logical reasoning such asModus Ponens orModus
Tollens are based on a-priori intuitions about correct reasoning.
If human reasoning deviates from the rules of logic, this could
mean for Cohen that these people have different a-priori intu-
itions about correct reasoning. So they are not irrational, but
their reasoning is merely based on a different norm of rationality.
Cohen understands his position as a generalization of Goodman’s
and Rawls’ coherentistic conception of a “reflective equilibrium,”
which involves the balancing of general intuitions about correct
rules and particular intuitions about rule-instances (Goodman,
1955; Rawls, 1971). I propose to call this family of positions “a-
priori intuition-based” conceptions of rationality, which I set in
opposition to a-posteriori success-based conceptions of rationality.
Intuition-based conceptions base rationality on a motley
“stew” of intuitions, including intuitions about the correctness of
cognitive rules such as Modus Ponens in logic or Bayes’ theorem
in probability theory. These intuitions are “subjectively a-priori”
in the sense that they are taken as primitively given, incapable
of further justification, although they can vary between different
subjects. For example, religious people would consider different
rules of reasoning as “intuitively rational,” compared to non-
religious people. It is therefore unavoidable that this conception
of rationality must lead to a strong form of cognitive relativism,
which has in particular been worked out by Stich (1990).
The notion of “prescriptive normativism” as characterized by
Elqayam and Evans (2011) or Evans and Over (1996, p. 8) seems
to correspond to a-priori intuition-based conceptions rationality.
I agree with Elqayam and Evans’ criticism of these positions: they
take unreliable subjective intuitions as sacrosanct and thereby
hinder rational criticism and scientific progress. However, the
opposite of a-priori intuition-based conceptions of rationality are
not “descriptive” conceptions of rationality (whatever these may
be), but rather a-posteriori success-based conceptions of rational-
ity, which evaluate systems of reasoning in terms of the cognitive
value of their consequences in the given environment.
The emphasis of the local adaptivity of successful reasoning
systems, i.e., the dependence of their value on the environment
in which they are applied, is a central insight of the research pro-
gram of ecological rationality. Todd and Gigerenzer (2012, p. 15)
write: “We use the term logical rationality for theories that evalu-
ate behavior against the laws of logic or probability rather than
success in the world,” while “The study of ecological rational-
ity is about finding out which pairs of mental and environment
structures go together.” Todd and Gigerenzer’s understanding of
“logical rationality” matches our notion of a-priori intuition-
based accounts of rationality, and their notion of ecological
rationality fits with our understanding of a-posteriori success-
based accounts, except that I support a dualist standpoint (similar
to Evans, 2003), according to which not only locally adapted but
also certain general reasoning methods can be justified in this
success-based way (see the section on General vs. Locally Adapted
Rationality).
In the light of contemporary epistemology (cf. Greco and
Turri, 2013), a-priori intuition-based accounts are internalist
accounts of rationality, because they understand the rationality
of a cognitive act as an internal property of the underlying cog-
nitive process of the agent, independent from the environment.
What these accounts have in common with deontological ethics
is that they evaluate the moral rightness of an act solely based
on the properties and intentions of the actor at the time of act-
ing, independent from its consequences. In contrast, a-posteriori
success-based accounts are externalist accounts of rationality,
inasmuch as the success of a cognitive act depends on its con-
sequences in the given environment; this is what these rationality
accounts have in common with consequentialist ethics.
I do not deny that a-posteriori success-based accounts of ratio-
nality also involve some elements of intuition. But their intuitive
elements can be narrowed down to a few fundamental intuitions
about human goals whose realization are assumed to be valu-
able (which is a fact-value bridge principle of the explained sort).
What a-posteriori accounts reject is reliance on epistemic cor-
rectness intuitions, i.e., intuitions about the epistemic correctness
or plausibility of rules of reasoning. In a-posteriori accounts, all
epistemic correctness claims of this sort have to be justified by
means-end inferences, which attempt to show that the respec-
tive rules are instrumental for attaining the assumed goals in the
assumed class of environments.
The notion of success contains an objective component (suc-
cess in the given environment) as well as a subjective component
(success for assumed goals). As long as the “goals” for an action are
not specified, it is prima facie unclear what is meant by “success.”
Todd and Gigerenzer avoid making any general statement about
what the success of cognitive methods consists in. In all of their
experiments, however, they assume that the success of a cognitive
method increases with the frequency of its “correct” or empir-
ically true inferences (or predictions), and decreases with the
cognitive costs of the method, in terms of necessary information
search and computation time. This understanding of “cognitive
success” is widely accepted in cognitive science. Philosophers
often neglect the dimension of cognitive costs and define truth-
conduciveness (attainment of true and avoidance of false beliefs)
as the fundamental epistemic goal (David, 2005). A prominent
variant of this position is reliabilism (cf. Goldman, 1986; Schurz
and Werning, 2009)7 .
TRUTH-CONDUCIVENESS AND COGNITIVE SUCCESS:
INSTRUMENTALLY RATIONAL FOR ALMOST ALL PURPOSES
I suggest that the fundamental goal of cognitive methods in
a-posteriori accounts of rationality should be characterized as
the maximization of cognitive success, in the explained sense
of finding many possibly relevant truths with little cognitive
effort. While this position would find many friends within con-
temporary epistemology, the notion of “truth” seems to be less
popular in cognitive psychology. In their reply to Schurz (2011a),
Elqayam and Evans (2011, p. 278f) reject truth as the general goal
of reasoning, in favor of an unspecific notion of “instrumental
rationality,” which is relativized to arbitrary goals. Before we dis-
cuss this position, let us analyze the goal of truth-conduciveness
7Goldman (1986) is an exception among epistemologists inasmuch as he also
discusses cognitive costs.
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or cognitive success in the light of the preceding discussion
of positions in ethics. Two general views are possible: (1) One
may understand truth-conduciveness as a fundamental epistemic
value, incapable of further justification; this understanding cor-
responds to a value-consequentialist position. (2) One may deny
that truth-conduciveness is an “intrinsic value,” but understand
the value of cognitive success instrumentally, in terms of its use-
fulness for the achievement of some given extra-epistemic (or
practical) purposes, whatever these purposes may be. The latter
viewpoint corresponds to the teleological position of instrumen-
tal rationality, which underlies the views of Elqayam and Evans,
Gigerenzer and Todd, and perhaps the majority of psychologists.
First of all, I wish to point out that although instrumental
norms or values are hypothetical in the sense explained in sec.
2, they are not “descriptive,” but nevertheless possess normative
or evaluative content. Recall that, although the second premise of
the means-end inference (1) is descriptive, its conclusion is nor-
mative or evaluative: it inherits this status from the first premise
which asserts that something is a fundamental norm, value, or
goal. This is also true when the fundamental value is given by the
factual subjective goal of one or many persons (together with a
fact-value bridge principle8). For example, if it is a fundamental
value for me to protect the environment, then it is a derived value
for me to support Greenpeace.
Secondly, Elqayam and Evans’ conception of instrumental
rationality may be relativized to any purpose whatsoever. They
endorse the view that “rational thinking is whatever kind of think-
ing best helps people achieve their goals” (Elqayam and Evans,
2011, p. 248). Let us ask: doesn’t this position imply that rational-
ity, itself, is entirely relative? On closer inspection, the notion of
instrumental rationality is semantically ambiguous. At least three
different conceptions of instrumental rationality exist in the liter-
ature: instrumental rationality as (i) technocratic rationality, (ii)
goal-relative rationality, or (iii) general all-purpose rationality.
While (i) maintains that instrumental rationality is ideologically
biased (Habermas, 1966), (ii) maintains that it is entirely relative:
there are as many kinds of instrumental rationality as there are
different kinds of human goals (Stich, 1990). Only position (iii)—
which I attribute to Evans and Over (1996, p. 8)—maintains that
instrumental rationality is general and non-relative.
Is it an unavoidable consequence of the notion of instrumen-
tal rationality that it is goal-relative? Do we have for each kind
of goal a separate account of rationality? Do environmentalists,
warriors, and taxi drivers, etc. each employ different methods of
rational reasoning? This seems to be entirely wrong. In this sec-
tion, I present a simple argument that shows that there is a form
of rationality that is instrumental for almost all purposes: this
form of rationality is contained in the idea of truth-conduciveness
in the explained sense. This is the practical reason why it makes
sense to separate epistemic from non-epistemic goals, and regard
the satisfaction of epistemic goals as a good, independent of the
practical goals which one actually pursues. I say “for almost all
purposes” because there are some important exceptions which I
8This bridge principle says: “If person X has goal A, and A is not in conflict
with other goals of X, then A’s realization is valuable for X” (cf. Schurz, 1997,
sec. 11.7).
will discuss later. First let me briefly explain—or since this is so
obvious, I should better say: recall—why truth-conduciveness is
all-purpose instrumental.
Maximizing the utility of one’s practical actions (whatever they
are) is usually explicated in terms of a decision situation. The task
is to choose that action among a possible set of competing actions
which has the maximum expected utility. Therefore, each deci-
sion problem can be reduced to a prediction problem whose task
it is to predict which of the possible actions will lead to a maximal
expected payoff (in Schurz, 2012 this method is used to reduce
action games to prediction games). To predict the expected payoff
of the available actions, it is necessary to predict the environmen-
tal conditions under which the actions will take place, and the
consequences of each action under these conditions. In this way,
practical success in a given decision problem depends on cogni-
tive success in a corresponding prediction problem. Therefore,
increased success in one’s predictions, as measured by the goal of
truth, will by and large lead to increased success in one’s practical
actions, independently of the goals which one pursues.
Elqayam and Evans reject truth-conduciveness as the supreme
cognitive goal for reasons which do not really conflict with my
arguments. They understand the notion of truth in a much
more “metaphysical” and less practical and empirical sense than I
do. For example, they argue that “cognitive representations are
viewed not as veridical, but as fit for purpose” (Elqayam and
Evans, 2011, p. 278). This is nothing but the teleological posi-
tion explained above. They continue with remarking that there
is no “true picture of the world which our eyes and brains deliver
faithfully to us. There is a mass of information in light, which
could be interpreted and constructed in many ways. In addition,
our visual systems have clear limitations.” From a philosophi-
cal standpoint all of this is obviously true. But this only means
that we never know the complete truth (“true picture”) of our
environment, and that our cognitive models are never free from
simplification and error. However, all that counts for practical suc-
cess is true information about practically relevant questions, for
example whether or not it will rain tomorrow, or whether the
value of a given share will go up or down. By “cognitive suc-
cess” I do not mean the achievement of fancy metaphysical truths,
but (at least primarily) the achievement of empirical (i.e., possibly
observable) truths, which are of possible relevance for our prac-
tical success. This position is not far from Elqayam and Evans,
who infer from their considerations that “cognitive representa-
tions are only veridical to the extent and in the manner required
to serve our goals.” In conclusion, I am inclined to think that
Elqayam and Evans’ “instrumental rationality” along with Todd
and Gigerenzer’s “adaptive rationality” and Evans and Over’s
“rationality1” can be subsumed under the family of a-posteriori
conceptions of rationality, which evaluate rationality in terms of
their cognitive success in the sense just explained.
Let me finally mention the big exception to the all-purpose
instrumentality of truthful beliefs. Our beliefs may have certain
direct effects on us that are quite independent from their truth
value. If I believe that a beloved person will visit me in an hour,
then this belief makes me happy for the next hour, quite inde-
pendently of whether or not this person actually comes. Schurz
(2001a) calls these effects the generalized placebo effects of our
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beliefs. Placebo effects have been extensively studied in the area
of medicine and pharmaceutics. For example, the mere belief in
the effectiveness of a sleeping pill accounts for more than 50%
of the success of a real sleeping pill. More generally, positive illu-
sions have positive effects on a person’s physical andmental health
(Taylor, 1989, p. 49, 88ff, 117ff). Particularly effective in this
respect are religious beliefs. Because of their selective advantages,
generalized placebo effects are to some certain extent built into
our cognitive processes and are the reason for certain cognitive
“biases” that have been discovered in the heuristics-and-biases
research in psychology. Piatelli-Palmarini (1996) classifies these
cognitive biases in seven groups, where at least three of them are
the result of genetically selected placebo effects: overconfidence,
hindsight bias, and self-righteous bias.
Placebo effects are real and useful effects, being produced
by one’s strong belief in some usually false state of affairs, for
example in one’s own superiority or in the existence of a safe-
guarding God. However, placebo effects break down as soon
as one comes to believe the truth: the resistance of my body
against cancer decreases when my doctor tells me that my chances
to survive are small (etc.). In conclusion, placebo effects are
the big exception to the all-purpose instrumentality of true
beliefs.
Let me emphasize that my comment concerning placebo
effects is only intended to direct attention to this problem, but not
to offer an adequate treatment (or “solution”) as the latter project
would exceed the scope of this paper. Rather than offer a solution,
I want to conclude my discussion of this problem with the fol-
lowing remark. The unjustified faith in one’s beliefs upon which
the placebo effect rests is at the same time practically dangerous:
it often leads to a dogmatic belief system which resists revision
through the scientific procedures of critical testing, and promotes
tendencies to solve conflicts by fiat or violence instead of rational
reflection. Despite the beneficial aspects of placebo effects, elimi-
nating vulnerability to placebo effects is a price that must paid as
a means to acquiring a scientific as opposed to a magical belief
system—a price that is worth paying, given the general value of
truth beliefs for practical action and the dangers of dogmatic
belief.
GENERAL vs. LOCALLY ADAPTED RATIONALITY: NOT A
NORMATIVE BUT A DESCRIPTIVE QUESTION
In the preceding sections, I investigated the normative side of
rationality. I distinguished two accounts of rationality, a-priori
intuition-based vs. a-posteriori success-based. To some extent
this distinction reflects Elqayam and Evan’s (2011) distinction
between prescriptive normativism and descriptive instrumental-
ism, and Todd and Gigerenzer’s (2012) distinction between logi-
cal and ecological rationality. Both accounts contain some norma-
tive elements (in this respect I disagree with Elqayam and Evans),
which are, of course, much stronger within intuition-based than
within success-based accounts. In the former accounts, the nor-
mative elements derive from a mixed bag of a-priori intuitions,
while in the latter accounts the only element of intuition concerns
the acceptance of cognitive success, i.e., practically relevant truth-
fulness, as the fundamental cognitive goal, which is justified by its
almost-all-purpose instrumentality for practical success.
There is, however, a second distinction, that between logi-
cally general vs. locally adaptive accounts of rationality. Todd and
Gigerenzer (2012, p. 15) as well as Elqayam and Evans (2011)
equate this distinction with the one between a-priori and a-
posteriori accounts: for them logically-general accounts would be
normatively justified in an a-priori manner, while locally adapted
accounts are a-posteriori justified by their cognitive success in a
given kind of environment. In my view, these two distinctions
should be treated as two independent dimensions of classification,
for the following reasons. Firstly, logico-general systems of rea-
soning can also be instrumentally justified, by their a-posteriori
success in regard to—not specific but varying—environments
and cognitive tasks. Secondly, the locally adaptive view of ratio-
nality can also be quite explicitly normative: Todd and Gigerenzer
(2012) is full of recommendations to use frugal locally adapted
heuristics instead of general logical tools. Thirdly, a local and
special-purpose-related cognitive method, such as Kahnemann
and Tversky’s availability heuristics, can also be justified by a-
priori intuitions: this is the way that such heuristics are justified
within Cohen’s (1981) “reflective equilibrium” account of cogni-
tive rationality.
While the question of deciding between a-priori intuition-
based vs. a-posteriori success-based accounts is a meta-normative
question, concerning the way normative recommendations can
be justified, the question of whether logico-general or locally
adapted reasoning methods are more successful is a descriptive
question, that only can be decided by computational and empir-
ical means. To avoid misunderstanding: this question cannot be
decided by finding out which cognitive methods are implicitly
used by ordinary people when they reason. This would involve
an is-ought fallacy, since we should not expect the actual rea-
soning of humans to always be cognitively successful or optimal.
However, the cognitive success of reasoning methods can be stud-
ied by means of logical arguments, by mathematical theorems,
and by empirical investigations of their performance in simu-
lated and real-world environments. In the following subsections,
I will sketch some typical success-based justifications of cogni-
tive methods, both of logico-general methods that are prominent
in philosophy, and of locally adapted reasoning methods that
have been promoted by defenders of ecological rationality. I will
show, in each case, that a closer inspection of these success-based
justifications reveals that the cognitive success of the respective
methods is limited to certain situations. The presented justifica-
tions of the “competing” cognitive methods do not really contra-
dict each other; only their uncritical generalization as “autocratic
paradigms” leads to mutual conflict.
INSTRUMENTAL JUSTIFICATION OF DEDUCTIVE REASONING
The standard justification of (classical) deductive reasoning con-
sists in the provable fact that this kind of reasoning preserves truth
with certainty: in all possible worlds in which the premises of a
deductive argument are true, the conclusion of the argument is
also true.
First of all, let me try to remove a misunderstanding which
is apparently involved in some arguments that set logical and
probabilistic accounts of reasoning in opposition to one another.
For example, Elqayam and Evans (2011, p. 278) infer from the
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fact that Bayesian updating is only possible if the probabilities
are non-extreme (different from 1 and 0) that truth-preserving
deductive inference is in conflict with Bayesian belief-updating. In
this argument they equate the truth of a premise with its having an
epistemic probability of 1. However, these two things are entirely
different: (1) Obviously, truth is different from having an epis-
temic probability 1, since something can be true despite the fact
that I don’t believe it, and vice versa. (2) Further, believing that
something is true is not the same as believing it with probability
1, because if I am a fallibilist then I will believe that the proposi-
tion I believe could be false, which means that I assign to them a
high but not maximal probability. Moreover, knowing that a set
of premises entails a certain conclusion can be cognitively useful
even if my degree of belief in these premises is non-maximal. It is
a straightforward theorem of probability theory that the probabil-
ity of the conclusion of a valid deductive inference must be at least
as high as the probability of the conjunction of its premises. Many
further theorems of this sort have been proved in the literature,
for example, that the uncertainty (i.e., 1 minus the probability)
of the conclusion must always be greater than or equal to the
sum of the uncertainties of the premises (Suppes, 1966, p. 54).
In conclusion, the account of deductive reasoning is not at all in
conflict with the account of probabilistic reasoning (see also the
section Instrumental Justification of Probabilistic Reasoning on
this point).
But let us ask: what does the truth-preserving nature of deduc-
tive reasoning imply regarding the cognitive success and useful-
ness of deductive inferences? In order to make cognitive use of a
deductive inference, two conditions must be satisfied:
(2) Conditions for the cognitive usefulness of a deductive inference:
(a) It must be possible for a person with “normal” cogni-
tive abilities to achieve reliable beliefs about the truth of each
premise, without (b) that the achievement of this belief relies
itself on the person’s belief in the truth of the conclusion.
Only if these two conditions are satisfied, can the cognitive pro-
cess of drawing the deductive inference produce a new belief for
the given person, which then is at least as reliable (i.e., probable
given the evidence) as the conjunction of its premises. Condition
(2a) entails that the premises must be consistent. Condition (2b)
is violated, for example, in trivial logical inferences such as “p and
q, therefore p,” since all persons with normal cognitive abilities
will, in the moment in which they start to believe a conjunction
of two beliefs, believe each of its conjuncts. This is not the case
in more complicated cases of deductive inference: for example,
no cognitively normal person will believe that there are infinitely
many prime numbers, from themoment that she begins to under-
stand and believe the axioms of Peano arithmetic. In cases of this
sort, deductive proofs produce new cognitive insights and, hence,
are cognitively useful.
In the last example, belief in the premises (Peano’s axioms of
arithmetic) are believed based on mathematical “intuition” or
postulate. In empirical applications, knowledge of the premises
must be based on empirical evidence. Here we meet a fur-
ther condition for cognitively usefulness. Nontrivial cognitive
inferences usually involve conditionals (implications), which in
classical logic arematerial conditionals “p→q,” whose truth-table
coincides with “¬p or q.” As a consequence, “p→q” follows
deductively from “¬p” and from “q.” I call a material conditional
trivially verified if the belief in it is justified either by the belief
in the negation of its antecedent (¬p) or by the belief into its
consequent (q). One can easily see that deductive inference from
trivially verified conditionals cannot be cognitively useful:
(3) Trivial verification of 1st premise by:
(a) Modus p→q ¬p: Then verification of 2nd premise
is impossible
Ponens: p q: Then conclusion is already known:
inference trivial
q
(b) Modus p→q q: Then verification of 2nd premise
is impossible
Tollens: ¬q ¬p: Then conclusion is already
known: inference trivial
¬p
Similar considerations apply to more complicated inferences (see
footnote 10), for example to inferences from disjunctions, such
as disjunctive syllogism: “p∨q, ¬p, therefore q.” It follows that
deductive inferences can only be cognitively useful if their con-
ditional or disjunctive premises are not known by trivial verifi-
cation. In empirical (non-mathematical) domains the standard
way of justifying a singular material conditional without know-
ing the truth value of its if-part and then-part is to infer it from
a corresponding general conditional, which is in turn inductively
inferred from the empirical evidence. For example, when I believe
that “if Jonny promises to come, then he will come,” I don’t
believe this because Jonny didn’t promise to come or because
he actually came, but because I inferred this prediction from his
promise-keeping behavior in the past.
In classical logic one can only express strictly general condi-
tionals, which don’t admit of exceptions and have the form “For
all x: Fx→Gx” (with “Fx/Gx” for “x has property F/G”). With
their help, the inference in (3a) is transformed into the following:
(4) Modus Ponens from the instantiation of a strictly universal
conditional:
For all x: Fx→Gx Nontrivial confirmation of the 1st
premise by a sample of Fs all of
a is an F which are Gs, where this sample
doesn’t contain individual a.
a is a G
It follows from these considerations that in application to empiri-
cal knowledge, the successful cognitive use of deductive inferences
is usually 9 restricted to situations which satisfy the following two
conditions:
9A generalization to deductive inferences of arbitrary kind is possible by the
following consideration: Statements which are verifiable by observation have
the form of closed literals, i.e., unnegated or negated statements of the form
(¬)Fa, or (¬)Rab, etc. (where F, R, etc. are primitive non-logical predicates).
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(A) The inference contains at least one conditional (or disjunc-
tive) premise which is explicitly or implicitly 10 general and
can only be confirmed by an inductive inference, and
(B) the generality of this premise is strict (i.e., exceptionless).
Condition (A) implies that without the simultaneous capacity to
reason inductively, deductive inferences are of almost no use in
empirical domains. So condition (A) alone is sufficient to refute
the view that deductive logic is an all “all-purpose” system of
reasoning: although its inferences are truth-preserving in all pos-
sible situations (or worlds), they are not cognitively useful in all
possible situations11, but only in those situations in which deduc-
tive reasoning competence is paired with success in inductive
reasoning.
I assume that for themajority of readers nothing of what I have
said is substantially new. But if this is so, I cannot understand
how one can seriously regard deductive logic as the only norma-
tive standard of reasoning. I guess that many of the hegemony
claims made on the behalf of given “normative systems” are more
the result of power struggles between Kuhnian “paradigms” than
of rational reflection.
Condition (B) is an equally severe restriction on the cogni-
tive use of deductive logic. Apart from laws in classical physics,
there are not many true and strictly general laws in the empirical
sciences. Most empirical conditionals are uncertain and admit of
exceptions; they have the form “Most Fs are Gs,” or “Normally, Fs
are Gs” (cf. Schurz, 2001b, 2002). Conditionals of this sort are
usually reconstructed as expressing high conditional probabili-
ties. Reasoning with them requires probabilistic systems, either in
the form of a conditional logic based on a probabilistic seman-
tics (cf. Adams, 1975; Schurz, 2005; Schurz and Thorn, 2012;
Thorn and Schurz, 2014), or within the full system of mathemat-
ical probability theory (see the section Instrumental Justification
of Probabilistic Reasoning). Experimental investigations of rea-
soning have confirmed that people frequently understand uncer-
tain conditionals in the sense of high conditional probabilities
(Evans et al., 2003; Schurz, 2007). We will see below, however,
that the application of probability theory (or of more advanced
mathematical theories) to empirical domains is also only cogni-
tively successful if it is paired with inductive reasoning mecha-
nisms which can provide empirical confirmation for the general
premises.
Note that conditions (A) and (B), above, are less restrictive
than it may seem. First of all, conditions (A) and (B) do not
apply to mathematical domains, where strictly general premises
However, deductive inferences among literals necessarily fail to meet condi-
tion (2b) of cognitive usefulness, because a literal follows from a set  of
literals if and only if it is an element of  [cf. (Schurz, 2011b), sec. 5.1, (5)].
10The conditional premise Fa→Ga is said to be implicitly general if it is justi-
fied by an argument which justifies a corresponding conditional Fai→ Gai for
every other individual constant ai. For example, Fa→Ga is implicitly general if
it is deductively inferred from the explicitly general premise ∀x(Fx→Gx), or
if it is inductively inferred from sample information of the form {Fb1→Gb1,
. . ., Fbn→Gbn}.
11My notion of a situation includes both (a) an objective (subject-
independent) environment, and (b) a constellation of subjective facts con-
cerning the given cognitive task and cognitive resources.
are given by axiomatic stipulation. No wonder, therefore, that
deductive inferences are most intensively used in the mathemat-
ical sciences. Secondly, the fact that inferences from uncertain
scientific laws require the use of probability theory does not make
deductive logic disappear, because probability theory is usually
formalized within standard type-free (Zermelo Fraenkel) set the-
ory, which contains in its core the full power of deductive logic,
which is needed, for example, to prove probability theorems from
probability axioms. Replacing mere logic by advanced mathemat-
ics only breaks the autocracy of logic, but not its omnipresence: all
higher-level mathematical theories still contain logic in their core.
In conclusion, standing on its own legs deductive logic is highly
useful in mathematical domains. In empirical applications, how-
ever, its cognitive use is confined to situations in which deductive
reasoning is combined with the results of inductive reasoning
procedures.
INSTRUMENTAL JUSTIFICATION OF PROBABILISTIC REASONING
The instrumental justification of probabilistic reasoning in
terms of cognitive success depends on the assumed concep-
tion of probability: statistical (objective) or epistemic (Bayesian,
subjective)12. The statistical probability of a property or event-
type Fx, p(Fx), is the limit of its relative frequency in an underlying
random sequence consisting of the consecutive outcomes of a ran-
dom experiment (important founders are Von Mises, 1964, and
Fisher, 1956). On the other hand, the epistemic probability of a
particular state of affairs or event-token Fa, P(Fa), is the degree of
belief, to which a given rational subject, or all subjects of a certain
rationality type, believe in the occurrence of the event (important
founders are Bayes, 1763; Ramsey, 1926; De Finetti, 1937).
The standard justification of Bayesian (i.e., epistemic) prob-
abilities is their interpretation as fair betting quotients. Ramsey
and de Finetti proved that a bettor’s fair betting quotients satisfy
the (standard Kolmogorovian) probability axioms if and only if
they are coherent in the sense that there is no finite class of fair
bets which under all possible circumstances lead to a total loss
for the bettor. According to this view, the cognitive usefulness of
coherent degrees of beliefs consists in the avoidance of sure loss,
independent from the given environment. Although I do not
deny that this form of probabilistic consistency is of “some use,”
it is certainly not enough for truthful prediction or successful
action in the actual world. The definition of coherent fair betting
quotients refers solely to the subjective mental state of the betting
persons, but it need not reflect the true frequencies of the bet-on
events. Take for example a subjective Bayesian who offers odds
of 1:1 that she will roll a six with a normal die, and considers the
bet fair, i.e., she is willing to accept the opposite bet at 1:1 that
she won’t roll a six. The Bayesian remains coherent even after
she has lost her entire fortune. She may be puzzled that while
everybody has readily accepted her bet, nobody has accepted the
counterbet, but she can’t explain why she of all people has lost
everything while others have made their fortune, as long as she
12We confine our discussion to these two most important conceptions of
probability. Further probability concepts which we cannot discuss here are
objective single case probabilities and logical probabilities. Cf. Gillies (2000,
ch. 3.13).
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doesn’t consider the frequentistic chances of the type of event she
has been betting on. This shows that Bayesian coherence provides
at best a minimal condition for rational degrees of belief, which
is, however, too weak to exclude irrational betting behavior from
an objective point of view.
In other words, subjective degrees of belief can only be cog-
nitively successful if they are related to statistical probabilities.
The most important connection between subjective and statis-
tical probabilities is expressed by a principle that goes back to
Reichenbach (1949) (cf. Schurz, 2013, p. 132):
(5) Principle of narrowest reference class: the subjective probabil-
ity P(Fa) of a single event Fa is determined as the (estimated)
conditional statistical probability p(Fx|Rx) of the correspond-
ing type of event Fx in the narrowest (nomological) reference
class Rx, within which we know a lies (i.e., that Ra is true).
The principle of the narrowest class of reference (also called the
“statistical principal principle”; Schurz, 2013, p. 262) is widely
used both in everyday life and in the sciences. If we want to deter-
mine the subjective probability that a certain person will take a
certain career path (Fa), then we rely on the characteristics of
this person which are known to us as the narrowest reference
class (Ra), and on the statistical probability that a person x with
the characteristics Rx will take this career path (p(Fx|Rx)). The
weather forecast “the probability that it will rain tomorrow is 3/4”
has, according to Reichenbach’s principle, the following interpre-
tation: the statistical probability that it will rain on a day which
is preceded by similar weather patterns as that preceding today is
3/4. Unterhuber and Schurz (2013, sec. 4.3) argue that Oaksford
and Chater (2007), too, seem to accept a principle of this sort.
Bayesian probabilities can only be truth-conducive and cog-
nitively useful if they are connected with statistical probabilities.
Only if we can reliably predict the true success probabilities of
our actions can our actions be useful. However, all knowledge
about statistical probabilities must be inferred from observations
of past instances or samples by means of inductive inferences.
So our conclusion concerning the cognitive usefulness of prob-
ability theory is similar to our conclusion for deductive logic: in
application to empirical domains, probabilistic reasoning is only
useful if it is combined with the capacity for successful induc-
tive inference. In fact, there exists a manifold of accounts which
explicate different forms of inductive inference in probabilistic
ways—for example, Fisher’s, and Neyman and Pearson’s account
of statistical tests, Fisher’s account of statistical inference based
on confidence intervals, the approach of Bayesian statistics based
on the updating of prior distributions, etc. (for an overview cf.
Schurz, 2013, ch. 4). Although it is not possible to enter into
the details here, we note that all of these accounts assume special
principles or rules that go beyond the basic axioms for coher-
ent probabilities and correspond to different forms of inductive
inference.
INSTRUMENTAL JUSTIFICATION OF INDUCTIVE INFERENCE: LOCALLY
ADAPTED METHODS
In the two preceding subsections we have seen that classical logic
and probability theory are far from being “all-purpose” cognitive
tools. To be sure, deductive inferences are truth-preserving and
coherent probabilities avoid sure-loss, but beyond that, the two
reasoning systems can only be successful in empirical applications
if they are paired with successful inductive inferences. It is the very
domain of inductive inferences, however, in which no universally
reliable method, nor even a universally optimal method, exists.
Negative results of this sort basically go back to the insights of the
philosopher David Hume and have more recently been proved
in the areas of formal learning theory (Kelly, 1996), machine
learning (Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi, 2006), and meta-induction
(Schurz, 2008; Vickers, 2010, §6.3). This is not to deny that in
the area of inductive prediction there are a variety of positive
results, but they either hold only under restrictive conditions, or
they hold only in the “infinitely long run,” and tell us nothing
about the cognitive success of a respective method in practi-
cally relevant time. So very naturally, inductive prediction tasks
have been the domain in which the paradigm of locally adaptive
or ecological rationality has emerged, which has been devel-
oped, among others, by Gigerenzer, Todd, and the ABC research
group13 . These researchers show, based on comparative inves-
tigations of the success of different prediction methods, that
simple prediction heuristics are frequently more successful than
more general and computationally costly prediction mecha-
nisms, following the slogan “less can be more.” Gigerenzer et al.
(1999) have studied several different heuristics at different lev-
els of generality. In this subsection I focus my discussion on
the performance of one of these prediction rules, known as
“take-the-best” (TTB).
The prediction tasks studied within the ABC research group
have the following format: prediction methods are based on so-
called cues C1,. . .,Cn, which are themselves predictive indicators
of a criterion variable X whose values or value-relations have to be
predicted. Each cue has a given probability of predicting correctly,
conditional on its delivering any prediction at all. This conditional
probability is called the cue’s ecological validity. In one of the typ-
ical experiments, the task was to predict which of two German
cities has a higher population, based on binary cues such as (C1)
is it a national or state capital?, (C2) does it have a first division
soccer team?, etc. In experiments of this sort, a cue (Ci) deliv-
ers a prediction if it “discriminates” between the two compared
objects: if the cue difference is +1 (value 1 for city A and 0 for
city B), the cue predicts XA > XB (city A is larger than city B); if
the cue difference is −1 (value 0 for city A and 1 for B), it pre-
dicts XB > XA (city B is larger than A), and otherwise it fails
to predict.
For each item (i.e., pair of cities), the strategy TTB pre-
dicts what the cue with the highest ecological validity predicts,
among all cues which deliver a prediction for the given item.
The frugality of this strategy consists in the fact that for each
item it bases its prediction on only one cue (that with the
highest validity). In contrast, more complex strategies predict
a certain (mathematical) combination of the predictions of all
cues. For example, the strategy called “Franklin’s rule” predicts
13Cf. Gigerenzer et al. (1999) and Todd and Gigerenzer (2012). “ABC” stands
short for the “Center for Adaptive Behavior and Cognition” at the MPI for
Human Development in Berlin.
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according to a weighted average of the cue differences of all
discriminating cues, where the weights are determined by the
(normalized) validities of the discriminating cues (Gigerenzer
et al., 1999, part III). If this weighted average is greater (or
smaller) than 0.5, Franklin’s rule predicts XA > XB (or XA
< XB, respectively). A still more complex prediction method
is linear (or logistic) regression: this method predicts a linear
(or logistic) combination of the cue differences with optimal
weights which minimize the sum of squared distances between
the actual value of the item (which takes +1 if XA > XB and
−1 if XA < XB) and the predicted linear (or logistic) combina-
tion of cues (Gigerenzer et al., 1999; Rieskamp and Dieckmann,
2012).
It can be proved that both regression methods have equally
maximal predictive success among all linear combinations, if
their weights are fitted to 100% of all items of the underly-
ing population (in our example all pairs of cities). In practice,
however, the weights are estimated from so-called training sets,
which consist of random samples of varying size (e.g., 20% of all
items). Likewise, Franklin’s rule and TTB estimate the validities
of the cues from their validities in training sets. This is the point
where the advantage of frugal strategies such as TTB comes in.
Regression methods, and to some extent also Franklin’s rule, suf-
fer frequently from the problem of overfitting: they fit the weights
or validities to random accidentalities of the sample which dis-
appear ‘in the long run,’ when the samples size approaches the
population size (cf. Brighton and Gigerenzer, 2012, Figures 2–
1; Rieskamp and Dieckmann, 2012, p. 198f, Figures 8–1, 8–2).
Based on simulated and real data, Rieskamp and Dieckmann
(2012) arrive at the result that linear weighting methods tend
to be better than TTB in environments of low redundancy, with
little (unconditional) correlations between the cues’ predictions,
while in high redundancy environments TTB tends to be better
than weighting methods (for small learning samples) or equally
good (for large learning samples)14. However, one can show that
Rieskamp and Dieckmann’s generalizations from their empiri-
cal results are not always correct. Schurz and Thorn (in review)
construct environments in which weighting rules are superior
in spite of redundant cues, as well as environments in which
TTB is superior in spite of non-redundant cues (see Appendix).
In the next section we will see that there is a systematic reason
for the difficulty of providing simple rules that characterize the
class of environments in which frugal prediction methods such as
TTB beat complex prediction methods such as Franklin’s rule or
regression.
A DILEMMA FOR ECOLOGICAL RATIONALITY, OR WHY A
DUAL ACCOUNT IS NEEDED
The success of any locally adapted prediction method depends on
its being applied in the “right” environment. However, biological
14Moreover, Rieskamp and Dieckmann report that in environments of low
redundancy, TTB performs better if the dispersion of the cues’ validities is
high. Logistic regression performs better than Franklin’s rule for training set
sizes of greater than 20%, except in environments of high redundancy and low
validity dispersion, in which logistic regression beats the other methods only
for training sets greater than 80%.
organisms, and especially humans, frequently face changing envi-
ronments. Within such environments, one needs strategies that
select for each relevant environment a method, or a combination
of methods, that performs as well as possible in that environment.
Following Rieskamp and Otto (2006, p. 207), I call this the
strategy selection problem.
Researchers within the adaptive rationality program acknowl-
edge the importance of the strategy selection problem. For Todd
and Gigerenzer (2012 p. 15), the study of ecological rationality
centers around the question of which heuristics are successful
in which kinds of environments. They propose a list of sim-
ple rules which indicate, for each of their studied heuristics in
which kind of environment it may be successfully applied, and
in which it may not (Todd and Gigerenzer, 2012, Table 1.1).
On closer inspection, however, their rules are problematic, either
because their application requires information that is unlikely
to be available, or because the rules are not always correct. For
example, the recognition heuristic (“base your prediction on that
cue which is best recognized by you”) is said to be ecologically
rational if its ecological validity is greater than 0.5. But since
this ecological validity is unknown in advance and only learn-
able in retrospect, this kind of selection rule is not very helpful.
Moreover, the rule is incorrect inasmuch as anybody who pos-
sesses a better method than the recognition heuristic should apply
this method instead of the recognition heuristic. Concerning the
take-the-best heuristic TTB, Todd and Gigerenzer (2012, p. 9)
assert (like Rieskamp and Dieckmann, 2012) that TTB is eco-
logically rational in environments with high cue redundancy
and highly varied cue validities, while linear weighting-rules
are said to be rational in the opposite types of environments.
However, as explained in the preceding section, the connec-
tion between high cue redundancy and TTB’s optimality can be
violated in both directions (see Appendix); so this rule is also
incorrect.
The preceding observations do not diminish the great suc-
cess of the adaptive rationality program in discovering surprising
“less is more” effects. They rather point toward an underde-
veloped area in this program, namely the selection-of-methods
problem. They also indicate a major challenge, and to a certain
degree even a dilemma, for the program of ecological rational-
ity. For if there were simple rules of the form “In environment
of type Ei, method Mi is optimal” (for i ∈ {1,. . .,n}), then
the combined strategy “For all i∈{1,. . .,n}: apply method Mi
in environment Ei” would be a universally optimal strategy.
The existence of such a strategy would, thereby, re-install uni-
versal rationality, and undermine the very program of adaptive
rationality.
Can universal rationality be re-installed in this simple way?
The answer is: No. Following from well-known results in formal
learning theory (Kelly, 1996) and meta-induction (Schurz, 2008),
there cannot be an inductive prediction or inference method
which is optimal in all environments among all possible pre-
diction methods. This fact has been frequently mentioned by
researchers within the adaptive rationality program (cf. Todd and
Gigerenzer, 2012, p. 5). A consequence of the cited result is that
there cannot be exhaustive and fully general meta-rules which
specify for each task and environment a locally optimal method.
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Schurz and Thorn (in review) call this fact the revenge of ecological
rationality.
While there is no ‘absolutely’ optimal selection strategy, the
ecological rationality program presupposes selection rules that
are at least “very” or “sufficiently” general. Obviously, selection
strategies can only have a cognitive benefit if their success is
highly general, applying to a large class of environments and
tasks. If such general selection strategies did not exist, one could
not explain why humans are so successful in selecting the ‘right’
method for their given environment, in spite of the fact that their
environment constantly changes.
What makes it difficult to find general rules for selecting meth-
ods is that the success-relevant features of the environment are
frequently cognitively inaccessible. Similarly, changes in the envi-
ronment are often unrecognizable and unforeseeable. To deal
with changing environments of this sort, one needs strategies
for learning which locally adapted methods perform best in
which environment, or in which temporal phases of the envi-
ronment. This brings us to the account of strategy selection
by learning proposed by Rieskamp and Otto (2006) and the
more general account of meta-induction developed in Schurz
(2008) and Schurz and Thorn (in review). While Rieskamp
and Otto suggest reinforcement as the learning method for
strategy selection, meta-induction is a more general family of
meta-level selection strategies which includes reinforcement as a
special case.
The account of meta-induction was developed within the
domain of epistemology as a means of addressing Hume’s
problem of induction (Schurz, 2008, 2009; Vickers, 2010),
thereby utilizing certain results from the domain of machine
learning (Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi, 2006). In this account, meta-
inductive selection strategies are considered as meta-level strate-
gies. Such strategies attempt to select an optimal prediction
method, or to construct an optimal combination of such meth-
ods, out of the toolbox of locally adapted prediction methods,
which are also called the object-level methods. Meta-inductive
strategies base their predictions on the so-far observed suc-
cess rates of the available object-level methods. The simplest
meta-inductive strategy is again TTB, which imitates the pre-
dictions of the so-far best available prediction method. The
difference between the model envisioned here and the typ-
ical experimental paradigm used within adaptive rationality
research is that within the present model TTB is applied at the
meta-level, as a means to selecting the right (combination of)
locally adapted prediction methods, rather than to the selection
of “cues.”
Recall the negative result that there is nomethod which is opti-
mal among all possible prediction methods in all environments.
In other words, no method is absolutely optimal. Of course, only
a fraction of all possible prediction methods is cognitively acces-
sible to any human-like agent. So at the meta-level, it is only
possible to include the cognitively accessible prediction methods
in the “toolbox” of candidate methods. This raises the following
question: is there a meta-inductive strategy which predicts opti-
mally in comparison to all candidate prediction methods that are
accessible to it, no matter what these methods are and in which
environment one happens to be? Schurz and Thorn (in review)
call this property access-optimality (i.e., optimality among all
accessible methods), in distinction to absolute optimality, which
is not restricted to the accessible methods.
The philosophical importance of this notion is this: if one
could prove that a universally access-optimal selection strategy
exists, its application would always be reasonable, independent
from one’s environment and one’s toolbox, because by apply-
ing this meta-strategy to the methods in one’s toolbox, one can
only improve but never worsen one’s success rate. Arguably, the
existence of such a method would also give us at least a par-
tial solution to Hume’s problem of induction (Schurz, 2008). It
can easily be shown that TTB is not universally access-optimal:
it fails to be access-optimal in environments where the success
rates of the available candidate methods are constantly oscillat-
ing (Schurz, 2008, Figures 1, 4). However, there is a certain linear
weighting strategy, so far unrecognized within the adaptive ratio-
nality research community, which is demonstrably universally
access-optimal in the long run. Schurz and Thorn (in review)
call this strategy attractivity-based weighting, AW, since it bases
its assignment of weights to the predictions of accessible meth-
ods on the “attractivities” of those methods, which depend on
the success differences between the object-level methods and AW.
In the short run, AW may earn a small loss (compared to the
so-far best prediction method) which vanishes if the number of
rounds becomes large compared to the number of competing
methods.
There are meta-level methods whose performance exceeds
that of AW in particular environments. For example, Schurz and
Thorn (in review, sec. 7) show that Franklin’s rule (if applied at
the meta-level) outperforms AW in certain environments, but
is worse than AW in other environments. In other words, all
improvements of AW are local and come at the cost of losing
universal access-optimality. This is again a “revenge effect” of
ecological rationality, which puts us into the following dilemma:
on the one hand, there is a meta-level strategy, namely AW,
which is universally access-optimal in the long run. On the
other hand, there are methods whose performance may exceed
that of AW locally, but only on the cost of losing universal
access-optimality.
Schurz and Thorn (in review) propose to solve this dilemma
by the following division of labor: At the meta-level of selec-
tion strategies, one should use a strategy which is access-
optimal, i.e., the strategy AW. If one finds a meta-method M∗
which is more successful than AW in some environments, then
one can improve the success of AW not by replacing AW by
M∗ at the meta-level, but by putting M∗ into the toolbox
of locally adapted methods and applying AW to this extended
toolbox.
Generally speaking, the account of Schurz and Thorn
(in review) proposes a division of labor between general meta-
level selection strategies and optimal (combinations of) locally
adapted cognitive methods. This proposed division of labor is
akin to the dual process accounts of cognition that have been
developed in the recent decades by a variety of psychologists15.
15Cf. Evans and Over (1996), Sloman (1996), and Stanovich (1999); for
excellent overviews cf. Evans (2003, 2008).
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These accounts explain human cognition by a division of labor
between two reasoning systems and corresponding processes:
“type 1” processes are usually characterized as unconscious or
implicit, heuristic, context-specific, perception- or action-related,
fast and parallel, and evolutionarily old (humans share them
with animals). In contrast, “type 2” processes are characterized as
conscious and explicit, analytic, context-general, symbolic, slow
and sequential, being an evolutionarily recent feature of homo
sapiens.
Although the fit of the dualistic account of local methods and
meta-inductive strategies with dual process accounts is not per-
fect, the basic similarities are clear. Firstly, the distinction between
locally adapted prediction strategies and general (meta-inductive)
selection strategies is a distinction between types of cognitive pro-
cesses (not between cognitive “rationalities”); so it rightly belongs
to the cognitive process level to which the type 1/2 distinction
applies (cf. Oaksford and Chater, 2012). Secondly, meta-inductive
strategies are conscious selection processes and thus belong to the
family of type 2 processes. In contrast, locally adapted prediction
or decision heuristics are often (though not always) type 1 pro-
cesses, whose control by type 2 processes is difficult and requires
cognitive training (Houde et al., 2000) and general intelligence
(Stanovich, 1999).
The preceding short remark concerning the relation between
the proposed dual account and contemporary dual process the-
ories must be sufficient. The main purpose of the dual account
of local methods and meta-strategies is to highlight the evolu-
tionary benefit of a division of labor between general cognitive
selection strategies and locally adapted cognitive methods. In
particular, this division of labor helps to solve the explained
dilemma facing ecological rationality program, i.e., the problem
of explaining how locally adapted reasoning strategies can be
cognitively successful in a situation of changing environments.
CONCLUSION
I began this article by outlining the distinction between normative
and instrumental conceptions of cognitive rationality (Elqayam
and Evans, 2011). The latter distinction was embedded into a
broader philosophical framework, classifying the former account
as deontological and the latter as teleological. While I agreed with
Elqayam and Evans’ critique of unjustified is-ought inferences
in normative accounts, I argued that in both accounts one must
make at least some value assumptions, which are based on some
form of intuition. However, while those accounts which Elqayam
and Evans call “normativist” are based on a mixed bag of a-
priori intuitions, instrumentalist accounts are based on just one
value—the value of cognitive success in the given environment.
I, therefore, proposed to replace the normative/instrumental dis-
tinction by the distinction between a-priori intuition-based vs.
a-posteriori success-based accounts of rationality. Cognitive suc-
cess should be understood as success in finding as many relevant
truths as possible with as few mistakes and cognitive costs. I
argued that the value of cognitive success lies in its instrumental
rationality for almost-all practical purposes.
After distinguishing between a-priori intuition-based vs. a-
posteriori success-based accounts of rationality, I pointed out that
this distinction is usually conflated with a second distinction:
that between logically general vs. locally adapted rationality. In
opposition to this conflation, I argued that these two distinctions
should be treated as independent dimensions of classification. The
question of whether logico-general or locally adapted reasoning
methods have greater cognitive success is a descriptive question
which can be decided by computational and empirical means. In
the case of classical logic and probability theory, I demonstrated
that logico-general systems of reasoning can be instrumentally
justified by their a-posteriori cognitive success. It turns out that
although reasoning according to classical logic and probability
theory have the advantage of preserving truth and avoiding incon-
sistency in all environments, they are not cognitively successful in
all situations, but only in those where they are paired with capac-
ity for successful inductive reasoning, which supplies deductive
or probabilistic reasoning with general premises about empirical
regularities. In the area of inductive inference, however, there is no
generally reliable or optimal reasoning method. No wonder, then,
that this is the domain in which the paradigm of locally adaptive
or ecological rationality has emerged.
In the final part of the paper, I argued that the fact that human
beings frequently encounter changing environments generates a
dilemma for the program of ecological rationality. On the one
hand, this program requires rules which specify for each heuristic
the kind of environment in which it may be successfully applied,
and in which it may not. On the other hand, some general argu-
ments show that a complete list of rules of this sort does not exist;
in fact, its existence would undermine the very program of eco-
logical rationality. As a way out of this dilemma, I argued for a
dual account of cognition, in which highly general meta-inductive
selection strategies are applied to a toolbox of locally adapted
cognitive methods.
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APPENDIX: TTB vs. FRANKLIN’S RULE IN ENVIRONMENTS
OF DIFFERENT REDUNDANCY (WITH P. THORN)
Figures A1+A2 illustrate a simulation of a prediction tourna-
ment in which Franklin’s rule predicts better than TTB, indepen-
dently of the cue redundancy of the environment. The value of a
binary target variable (with values 1, 0) had to be predicted based
on three binary cues (with values 1, 0) whose conditional success
probabilities were as follows:
p(event = 1|3-of-3 cues predict 1) = 0.9
p(event = 1|2-of-3 cues predict 1) = 0.7
p(event = 1|1-of-3 cues predict 1) = 0.3
p(event = 1|0-of-3 cues predict 1) = 0.1.
The validities were assumed to be known so that learning
errors play no role. By assuming different prior probabilities
over the cues’ combined predictions, one can make them
uncorrelated (non-redundant) or highly correlated (redundant),
without changing the result that in this environment Franklin’s
rule performs better than TTB, as shown in Figures A1+A2.
Figures A3+A4 exhibit an environment in which TTB pre-
dicts better than Franklin’s rule, independently of the degree of
cue redundancy. Here the success probabilities of the three cues
were as follows (with “C2/3” for “cue 2” or “cue 3”):
p(event = 1|C1 predicts 1,C2/3 predicts x2/3 ∈ {0, 1})
= 0.9 for all choices] of x2/3.
p(event = 0|C1 predicts 0,C2/3 predicts x2/3 ∈ {0, 1})
= 0.8 for all choices of x2/3.
By assuming either uniform prior distributions over the com-
bined predictions or positive correlations between the cues’ pre-
dictions one now obtains the result that TTB predicts better than
Franklin’s rule, both in low and high redundancy environments,
as shown in Figures A3+A4.
FIGURE A1
FIGURE A2
FIGURE A1+A2 | TTB against Franklin’s rule in a binary prediction tournament with known validities which are conditionally dependent. Figure A1
with low redundancy and Figure A2 with high redundancy of cues. In both cases, Franklin’s rule predicts better than TTB
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FIGURE A3
FIGURE A4
FIGURE A3+A4 | TTB against Franklin’s rule in a binary prediction tournament with known validities which are conditionally independent. Figure A3
with low redundancy and Figure A4 with high redundancy of cues. In both cases TTB predicts better than Franklin’s rule.
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